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At the beginningof the 1998 academic year EugenTobin, the presi‑
dent of HamiltonCollege in Clinton, NewYork, gave eachmember
of the incomingclass acopy of asmallbook containing the “Rules of
Civility andDecent Behavior in Companyandin Conversation” that
the fourteen-year-oldGeorgeWashingtoncopiedfromaseventeenth‑
century English translation of a sixteenth-century French book of
manners. In a note accompanying the book he expressed the hope
thatWashington’s ruleswould inspire students “to treat everyonewith
kindness, decency, respect and graciousness.” He explained, “Since
a liberal arts education is a rehearsal for dealing with differences
amonghumanbeings, the requisite arts of listening, understanding
andnegotiatingare amongthe most important intellectualskills and
virtueswe are calleduponto master.”1There is little to fault in Presi‑
dent Tobin’s understandingof the attitudes towards others that one
would hope to find in those who have taken the principles of lib‑
eraleducation to heart.Yet,with all due respect to the Fatherof Our
Country, at least some of Washington’s maxims cannot but strike the
modernreaderasrather odd.2
The listopens auspiciously: “lst. EveryAction done in Company,
ought to be with Some Sign of Respect, to those that are Present.”
But on theway to the sublime closing invocation to “Labour to keep
alive in your Breast that Little Spark of Ce[les]tial Fire CalledCon‑
science,” we r u n into this bit of prosaic advice about how to conduct
oneself aroundearthly fires: “Spit not in the Fire, no r Stoop lowbe‐ ,
fore it neitherPutyour Hands into the Flames towarm them, nor Set
your Feetuponthe Fireespecially if therebemeatbefore it” (Rule9).
Sometimes the adviceWashington gives isstraightforwardenough‑
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“3d. Shew Nothingtoyour Friend that may affright him”‐while at
other times it isunsettlinglydetailed: “13th. KillnoVermin asFleas,
lice ticks 6:0 in the Sight of Others, if you See any filthor thick Spittle
put your foot Dexteriously upon it if it be upon the Cloths of your
Companions, Put it off privately, and if it be uponyour own Cloths
return Thanks to himwho puts it off.” Washington’s rules include a
brief discussion of fashionable dress (Rules 51ff.) andof table man ‑
ners (Rules 90ff.) aswell assome advice that participants in under‑
takings such asthe present one might well take to heart: “80th. Be
not Tedious in Discourse or in readingunless you find the Company
pleasedtherewith.”
The body looms rather large in these rules (whichshould come
asno surprise to readers of Norbert Elias). Every inchof it must be
keptunder scrutiny, asif it were aprovinceonthe brinkof rebellion.
2d.When in Company, put not your Hands to any Part of the
Body,notusual[l]yDiscovered.
4th. In the Presenceof Others Singnot to yourselfwith ahum‑
mingNoise,norDrumwithyour Fingersor Feet.
10th.Whenyou Sit down, Keepyour Feetfirm andEven,with‑
out puttingone on the other or Crossingthem.
11th. Shift not yourself in the Sight of others no r Gnaw your
nails.
12th. Shake not the head, Feet, or Legs rowl not the Eyes lif t
no t one eyebrowhigher than the otherwry not the mouth, and
bedewnomans facewithyour Spittle,byappr[oachingtoo nea]r
him [when] you Speak.
53d. Run not in the Streets, neither go t[oo s]lowly no r wit[h]
MouthopengonotShakingy[ou]rArms [kicknot the earthwith
yr feet, go] not uponthe Toes, no r in aDancing [fashion].
Evenone’s facialexpressions mustbe carefullymanaged:
19th. let your Countenance be pleasant but in Serious Matters
Somewhatgrave.
20th. The Gestures of the Bodymust beSuited to the discourse
you are upon.
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22d. Shewnotyourself gladat the Misfortuneof another though
hewere your enemy.
23d. When you see a Crime punished, you may be inwardly
Pleased;but always shewPityto the SufferingOffender.
Another group of Washington’s maxims are concerned with
the demands of asociety in which there are superiors and inferiors:
one must learn to give the former the deference that is owed them.
Rules 26and27provideuswith agonizingly detailed descriptions of
how to go about removinghats asa sign of respect, Number 28 ad‑
dresses theproblemof when to sit andwhen to stand,Number29 ne‑
gotiates entry through doorways, Number 30 deals with how indi‑
viduals are to arrangethemselveswhilewalkingdownthe street,while
Numbers 31and32address the question of who gets which lodgings
when traveling. Indeed,eventhesimple taskof unfoldinganapkinata
table requires attentionto what others are doing:
104th. It belongs to the Chiefest in Company to unfoldhis Nap‑
kinand fall to Meat first, But heought then to Begin in time &
to Dispatch [w]ithDexteritythat the Slowestmayhave time al‑
lowedhim.
One canonlywonderwhat impact this advicehashadondiningprac‑
tices amongthe first-year students atHamiltonCollege.
That Washington’s rules should be distributed to college stu‑
dents at the close of the twentieth century tells ussomething about
the curious career of the notion of civility: it is something which a
goodmanypeople are inclinedtopromote,even though theymaynot
be entirely sure what it is that they are promoting. A small part of
the floodofbooks andarticles on“civility” and “civil society” has ap‑
peared in the last severalyears. All of these discussions appear to be
ingeneralagreement that somethingcalled“civility” isagoodthing‑
a “virtue,” if youwill‐and it is agood thingbecause it brings about
the conditions that sustain the existence of “civil society”‐which is
regardedasavery goodthing.Asone example amongmany,consider
the “strategy for renewal” of civil society publishedby the “Council
of Civil Society”‐aself-describedgroup of “nationally distinguished
scholars and leaders” chairedby Jean BethkeElshtainof the Univer‑
sityofChicago.Amongits recommendationsareproposalsforstrength‑
ening the family (bymakingdivorces harder toget), fosteringgreater
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piety andcharity (throughlegislationthatwouldpermit “faithbased
organizations,without denyingor relinquishingtheir religious char‑
ter, to compete on equal terms with other private groups for govern‑
ment contracts to deliverwelfare services to the poor”),andencour‑
aging less consumerism andmaterialism (by encouragingemployers
“to recognize the moraldimensions of the decisions they make” and
urgingcitizens to “resist the pressureto acquiremore andmoremate‑
rial things”).3 ,
It ishardto saybadthings about civility.4 But it mightbeworth
atry, especiallygiven the elusiveness of the thingthat isbeingpraised.
Letmebeginbybrieflyconsideringwhat it means for somethingtobe
avirtue, andthen goon to consider howcivility andcivilsociety have
beenusedduringthose periods in historywith amore subtle under‑
standing of the nature of virtues thanwe‘seem to have today. After
that, I will consider some of the differences between traditional and
more recent uses of these terms and conclude by examiningwhat it
means to speak‐as Edward Shils and Stephen Carter haves‐of a
“virtue of civility.”
VIRTUES, PRACTICES,AND SOCIETIES
If pressed for a brief account of what aVirtue is, it would be
difficult to improveonthe definitionAristotle offers in Book II of the
NicomacheanEthics.Arete (“virtue,” or, more literally,“excellence”)
causes its possessors to be in agood state and to perform their
functions well; the virtue of the eyes, e.g., makes the eyes and
their functioning excellent, because it makes them see well;
andsimilarly,thevirtue of ahorsemakesthehorseexcellent,and
thereby good at galloping, at carrying its rider and at standing
steady in the face of the enemy. If this is true in every case, the
virtue of ahumanbeingwill likewisebethe state that makes a
humanbeinggoodandmakeshimperformhis functionwell.6
Aristotle situated his account of the virtues in a more general ac‑
count of humanactionwhich sees it asteleological (seekingto attain
certain ends andgoals), assubject to reflectivecorrection (that is,we
are capable of reflectingonwhatweare doingandimprovingit), and
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astranspiring in concert with others. Thus, in discussing the virtues
that allowedTedWilliamstobecomethe last .400hitter in baseball,we
wouldneedto consider hisnaturalability to followpitches until they
were almostat the plate,the skillsheacquiredin reckoningwhere the
ballmightbe goingin the split secondwhenhe couldno longermain‑
tain sight of i t , and the happy and contingent historical fact that he
was amember of asociety in which peculiar talents such asthese
couldbeutilizedwithin acomplex socialpracticeknownasbaseball.
Forcivility to beavirtue, accordingto this account, it wouldbe
necessaryto showthat it allowedits possessor to performcertain func‑
tions well. To the extent that knowledge of when to unfoldnapkins,
howto tip hats,andwhere to put one’s hands fits one for the practice
of interactingwith others in asociety of acertain sort,Washington’s
rulesof civilitywould seem, unproblematically,tobevirtues.But,of
course, there is more to the question than that. Virtues, asAlasdair
MacIntyrehas remindedus, are embeddedin specific practices,and
the possessionof virtues that are specific to certainpractices maynot
berelevant for otherpractices (justasMichaelJordan’s virtues proved
massively irrelevant to the practice of baseball, soTedWilliams‑
while anexcellentmemberof the RedSox‐wouldprobablynothave
beenaseffective asaCeltic). It isalso quitepossible tobeexcellent in
thepursuitof anynumberof particularpractices andneverthelessstill
beless than excellent asahumanbeing. Moralvirtues, in Aristotle’s
account, are those virtues that enable us to be good humanbeings.
The question that weprobablywant to see answeredabout civility is
notwhether it isavirtue, butwhat it has to dowithmoralvirtue.
One problemwith accounts of virtues of the sort I have been
givingisthat it isnot always clearwhether one hasgivenasufficiently
generalizedaccount of what it is to beagoodhumanbeingto escape
the risk of defining human excellence in terms of a rather specific
set of traits, peculiar tooneparticular society, but not toothers. Thus
Washington’s “EveryAction done in Company,ought to bewith Some
Sign of Respect, to those that are Present” mayvery well be anorm
thatwouldhave to be followed in order to foster interactionsbetween
individuals in any conceivable society. If civility meant this, andonly _
this, it mightbe amoralvirtue. Yet we couldeasily imagine a society
functioningquitehappily inwhich individualsjostled their feet under
the table, unfolded their napkins with little or no regard for what
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others were doing, and left their hats on their heads asthey passed
one another in the street.Wouldwewant to say that asociety of this
sort, though “uncivil” by Washington’s standards, was in any sense
“immoral”?
Another problemwith the status of civility asavirtue has to
dowith the breadth of its concerns. Aristotle’s virtues tend to have
aparticular rangeof applicability. Courage involves themanagement
of feelings of confidence and fear in situations of threat anddanger.
Temperance is Concernedwith the proper enjoyment of bodilyplea‑
sures. Generosity has to dowith the use of money.Wittiness is con‑
cernedwith saying and listeningto the right things in the rightway,
and soon. A glance atWashington’s list suggests that civility is con‑
cerned with somany different things that it is difficult to Specify
the rangeof its applicability. It would seem to dealwith nothingless
than the successfulmanagementof social relationswithothers.There
is, however,at leastone virtue inAristotle’s account that has the same
expansiveness: justice. At the start of BookV Aristotle explains that
justice isusedin two senses. In itsmostpreciseusage it denotes apar‑
ticular virtue concernedwith the questionof fairness in the distribu‑
t ion of things that are either scarce or whichwould losetheir goodness
if everyone hadthem in equal amounts. But it is also used in amore
general sense inwhich it means “lawfulness”‐-doingthose things the
lawcommands. To bejust in this latter sense is to be able to fulfill all
the demands which the politicalcommunity makes onits members.
To do this, one mustpossess all of the virtues which fit one for politi‑
cal life. Justice in this more extensive sense thus means nothingless
than the possessionof the totality of all the other virtues.
In this light,Washington’s civility begins to look like a some‑
what impoverishedversion of Aristotle’s definition of justice aslaw‑
fulness. It includes some, but not all, of the virtues that are needed
for successfulperformanceof one’s responsibilities asamemberof a
politicalcommunity.Yet it seems to have less to dowithmembership
in the political community than with membership in “civilized so‑
ciety,” tohaveless todowith “morality” thanwith “manners.” Sinceall
these terms haverichandintertWinedhistories,perhapswecanmake
some headwayin understandingthe sense inwhichcivilitymightbea
virtue if we lookat what it meant in Washington’s time for something
to be a“civil” society. ‘
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CIVILITYAND CIVIL SOCIETY
Samuel johnson’s dictionary of 1755 provides adefinition that
liesclose enoughtoWashington’s day to serve asapointof departure.
It begins simplyenough: “1. Relatingto the community; political; re‑
latingto the cityor government.” But johnson thenproceeds to define
civil in terms of what it is not, andin theprocessproducesarather cu‑
rious list:
3. Not in anarchy; no t wild; no t without rule or government.
4. Not foreign, intestine. 5. Not ecclesiastical. . . . 6. Not natu‑
ral. . . . 7.Notmilitary. . . . 8. Not criminal. . . . 9.Civilised; not
barbarous. 10.Complaisant; civilized; gentle;well bred; elegant
of manners; not rude; no t brutal; no t coarse. 11. Grave; sober;
not gay or shewy. 12. Relatingto the ancient consular, or impe‑
rialgovernment. . .
This set of definitions captures one crucial feature of eighteenth‑
century usagesof civil: to say that somethingis “civil” moreoftenthan
not meant to say that it is not something else. Thus, if welook at the
history of usages of the term civil society, we find that the term has
taken onavariety of different meanings through its juxtaposition to a
series of other forms of association.7
The term civilsociety itselfenteredWesternpoliticaldiscourse
in the translation of Aristotle’s Politics by the great Florentine civic
humanist Leonardo Bruni. Bruni used “societas civilis” to translate
Aristotle’s koinonia politike‐a term that he used asaway of ex‑
plainingwhat sort of community (or koinonia) the polis was: it was a
political community, andAristotle began the Politicswith acontrast
between the politicalcommunity orpolis and the domestic commu‑
nity or oikos. This juxtaposition exercised an enormous influence in
the historyofpoliticalthought, andaslateasLocke’s SecondTreatise
andBousseau’s entryon “Political Economy” in Diderot’sEncyclope‑
dia,wefindcivilor politicalsociety definedby contrasting it with the
household.Wecanalsofindawell-established tradition in whichcivil
society is juxtaposed to ecclesiastical forms of association: Augustine
spoke of “two cities or societies [duae civitates hoc est societates],”
the cioitas Deiandthecioitas terrena (CioitateDei 12.1),andAquinas
followed suit, juxtaposing the communitas civilis to the communitas
24 What Is Civility?
dioina (Summa Theologiae 12.100.20). In the seventeenth andeigh‑
teenth centuries similar distinctions would beelaborated in Locke’s
LetteronToleration andKant’sReligionWithin the Limitsof Reason
Alone. Civil societywas also defined, in modernnatural lawtheories,
bycontrasting it with aprepolitical state of nature. Finally, civil (or
“civilized”) society could also bedefinedby contrasting it with those
“rude” societies inhabitedby “savages” who livedwithout laws, con‑
veniences, or commerce. Thus, at one or anotherpoint in history,the
term civilsociety might havebeendefined in opposition to domestic,
to ecclesiastical, to natural, or to rudesocieties.
In all of these juxtapositions, civil society is synonymous with
“politicalsociety”‐Locke, to cite the most famous example,usedthe
two terms asequivalents in Chapter V I I of the Second Treatise: “Of
PoliticalorCivil Society.” In thinkingabout theway that civil society
is to be distinguished from these other societies, one may focus on
those peculiarvirtues‐designatedas“civic”virtues‐that distinguish
the free headof the householdfromothermembersof the family, that
distinguish the citizenwho pursues ends in thisworld from theChris‑
tian who aims at salvation in the next, that distinguish anindividual
who has subjectedhimself to the conditions of asocial contract from
the resident of the state of nature, or (finally) that distinguishacivi‑
lized and polished individual from arude barbarian. Given the di‑
versity of modes of life that are definedas“uncivil,” it is littlewonder
that the particularvirtues associatedwith civic lifeshouldbesowide‑
ranging or sovariable. Thus the rules of civility that Washington
copied out mightbeunderstoodasdefiningcivil life across anumber
of these different dimensions: to be civil is‐‐at one and the same
t ime ‐ t o strive to avoid fallingback into abrutish rudeness (so keep
that greasy knife out of the salt), to be sensitive to the joys of worldly
fellowship (sobetedious onlyamongthosewhoWon’tmindit), tohave
left behindthe world of women and servants andentered into a do‑
main of men who deserve equal respect (so give that respect to all
those with whom one keeps company), and to have entered into a
societywhere‐unlike the equality of the state of nature‐there are
clearly laidout ranks anddivisions (sowait for cues fromyour betters
before unfoldingnapkins).
The rules of civility that the youngWashington copied in 1744
thus give usaglimpse of the sorts of Virtues that acitizen of acivil so‑
ciety requiredin order toperformthe roledemandedof him.Yet this
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listwas, evenin Washington’s ownday, likelyto havebeenadatedand
garbledone. Hehadcopiedit froma1640Englishtranslationof alist
of FrenchJesuit Rules of Civility andDecent Behavior dating from
1595.Therewas avast difference between the world of asixteenth‑
centuryFrenchgentlemanandthat of amemberof the gentry in\co‑
lonialAmerica. Asatrivial example, consider the matter of napkins.
BrissotderWarville, aneighteenth-century Frenchvisitor, recorded
with astonishment that ..
Virginians do not use napkins, but they wear silk' cravats, and
instead of carrying white handkerchiefs they blow their noses
eitherwiththeir fingers (I haveseen the best‐bredAmericans do
this) orwith asilk handkerchiefwhich also serves asacravat, a
napkin,etc.8 ‑
It is thus possible that the young Washington copied out rules for
the use of anitem that hewould encounter only infrequently. But
more is at stake here than simply the absence of napkins in colonial
Virginia. In French society at the close of the sixteenth century, it
wouldhavebeenobviouswho one’s betterswere. If suchnotions may
havebeenmoredifficult tomaintain in colonialAmerica, theywould
becomealmost impossible in apostcolonialAmerica,where, asAlexis
deTocqueville‐that most famous of all French visitors to the new
democracy‐wouldobserve, alldistinctions of status andrankseemed
tomeltaway intoonevast, undifferentiatedclass of relentlesslyactive
individuals. Whatever rules of civility Washington put together in
1744wouldhave to be revised in the course of framing those virtues
requiredfor free citizens of the mostambitious attemptat republican
self-govemance sinceantiquity. The ageof democratic revolutions re ‑
quiredarethinkingofwhatconstitutedappropriately republicanforms
of civility,andbothin Franceandin the newly independentcolonies
one finds extendeddiscussions of the sorts of mores andmanners ap‑
propriate to afree society of equals.Washington himselfwas forced
to ransackantiquity for the propermodelof aleader of arepublic‑
hefound it in Cincinnatus, the generalwho savedRomein its hourof
greatest needandthen resignedhis office to return to his farm. Ben‑
jamin Franklin,on the other hand,experimented in his ownwritings
with the construction of a persona that combined the traits of com‑
mercial industriousness, scientific inquisitiveness, and democratic
‐ v v v . A u ; L O u n v m t } .
simplicity‐apersona thatwouldwinhimfame inEuropeasthe most
illustriousnewman from the strange newworld.
REDEFININGCIVIL SOCIETY: FAITH,THE FAMILY,
AND THE MARKET
Anyone familiarwith these eighteenth-centurypatternsof usage
cannot help finding something peculiar about some of the ways in
which the terms civility andcivilsociety are beingusedin recent dis‑
cussions. It is asif all the finelywrought distinctions betweencivil so‑
ciety andother forms of association havebeendissolved. The report
of the CouncilonCivilSociety, for instance,assures usthat the family
is“certainly civil society’s most important institution”‐yet, inWash‑
ington’s day, civil society referredto that domain of activities that lay
outside the sphere of domestic life. Likewise,StephenCarter doubts
that “we can reconstruct civility in Americawithout a revivalof reli‑
gion asaforce in both our public andprivate lives”9‐yet the eigh‑
teenth century fought hardtodistinguish civil society from religious
forms of association.AndLawrenceCahoonehas toldusthat “civil so‑
ciety isnot primarilypolitical” andtotreat it assuch isto “engage in
anovervaluation of the political”‐yet, before the beginningof the
nineteenthcentury, it is impossible to findathinker who understands
civil society asanythingother than apoliticalsociety.10Alasdair Mac‑
IntyrebeganAfter Virtue by imaginingasituationwhere, after acol‑
lapseofcivilization,anewgenerationbeganpickingupbits andscraps
of what had survived from the earlier scientific writings and pro‑
ceeded to use its terms in ways that bore scant resemblance to earlier
patterns of usage. He proposed this asan analogy for what hadbe‑
fallenmoderndiscussions of virtue. It might also serve asaroughap‑
proximation of what has happened to discussions of civil society: a
term thatwas once employedtocarve out adomain that was political,
rather than adomestic or anecclesiastical society, has nowbeende‑
politicized,domesticated, andsacralized.
Butwhy holdeighteenth‐century usage assacrosanct? Though
AlanWolfemaybewrongto claimthat Hegelsaw the family as“acru‑
cial component of civil society”11(Hegel, in fact, emphasizes that the
family is not part of civil society, asheunderstands it),he is on firmer
groundwhenhesuggests that “ i t iscertainlyusefulto inquire into the
origins of the term civil society, and to be remindedof its context in
eighteenth‐century Scotlandornineteenth-centuryGermany,butjust
aboutallthetermsweuse todaymeant somethingdifferentwhen they
were introduced.” The fact thatweare deviating from earlier usages
of civilsociety should not,Wolfe goes on to argue, “prevent usfrom
using the term today to describe families, churches, and neighbor‑
hood associations‐so long aswe are clear that we are doing so.”12
Wolfe maybe right that it would bepedantic to hold to eighteenth‑
century usages. But surely part of what might be involved in being
“clear” asto how“we” are usingthe term civilsociety todaywould in ‑
volve aconsiderationof howthe meaningof the term has shiftedand
what the implicationsof,this transformationmightbe. To dothis,we
needto examine the transformations in usages of civilsociety that are
associatedwith the names Locke,Hegel,andTocqueville.
When Leonardo Bruni translated Aristotle’s Politics in 1438,
heused“civilis societas” to renderAristotle’s koinoniapolitike.Bruni’s
translation established a convention that would have a remarkable
stayingpower:civilsociety isatermof art usedbypoliticaltheorists to
describe that formof associationwhich isconventionally calledapolis
oracivitas. Butwhile the linguisticconvention of identifyingthe civi‑
tas asasocietascivilis continues into the eighteenthcentury,problems
beginto arisewith the continueduse of the term cioitas. For Bruni, a
humanistandrhetoricianwho twice servedasthe headof the Floren‑
tineChancellery, it was unproblematic that Florencewas acivitas and,
hence,aformofpoliticallife rather likeancient Athens. Heregularly
drewonmodelsprovidedbyancient authors1nthe speecheshedeliv‑
ered aspart of his duties, and his translation of the Politics15filled
with terms that hetook from Florentinepoliticaldiscourse13The vo‑
cabulary of civic republicanism, avocabulary which Bruni played a
major role in crafting, ledfifteenth-century Florentines to interpret
their political life in anarrative that hearkenedback to the Roman
RepublicandtheAthenianpolis.While it was possible for Bruni and
his contemporaries to narrate their political life in these terms, it
was difficult for later thinkers tomaintain the analogy. Consider that
remarkable moment when Jean-Jacques Rousseau invokes the con‑
vention Bruni founded to describe what issues from the social con‑
tract andthen immediately realizes that it doesn’twork: “This public
person,formedthus byunionof allthe others formerly took the name
city, and at present takes the name republic or body politic,which
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is called state by its members when it is passive, sovereign when it
is active,powerwhen'it is compared to others like itself.”14He inserts
afootnote immediatelyafter thewordcity which reads:
The true meaningof this word isalmost entirely lost onmodern
men. Mostof themmistakeatown for acity andabourgeois for
a citizen. They do notknowthat housesmakea townbutcitizens
makeacity.
After this momentarynostalgia for away of speakingthat his contem‑
poraries have forgotten, Rousseauproceeds (back in the text itself) to
plowthrough the various differentwords‐“people,” “citizens,” “sub‑
jects”‐that are used to refer to those who are associated in the so‑
cial contract before observing, “But these terms are often confused
andmistakenfor one another. It isenough toknowhowto distinguish
themwhen they are usedwith absoluteprecision.”
This, however, is not enough, and Rousseau‐as the footnote
suggests‐knows it. Modern men don’t know how to use political
terms inheritedfrom the ancientworldbecause theynolonger live in
the forms of politicalcommunity that gave rise to this vocabulary. Try
ashe will, Rousseau cannot get around the ugly fact that amodern
“state” is not what used to be called a “city” and a modern “city” is
neither acioitas nor apolis. The experience of political life has un ‑
dergone asea change with the collapse of the small, self-governing
city‐republics of RenaissanceEurope.The category of “civil society”
was abstract enough to survive this transformation unscathed‐but
not the assumptionthat the civitaswas the locusof politicallife.Thus,
eventhose thinkerswhocontinuedto insist that acivil societywas apo- »
litical society could questionwhether the “state” or the “government”
was identical with civil society. Consider Locke. In Chapter XIX
of the SecondTreatise hecarefully distinguishes betweenthe “disso‑
lution of society” and the “dissolution of government,” arguing that
it is possible to “dissolve” government while leaving “society”‐by
which hemeant “civil society”‐intact. The actions of monarchs such
asCharles II or James I I ,which alter theway inwhich society is gov‑
. erned,mayleadto a“dissolutionof government” in which those asso‑
ciated into acivil (andthus stillpolitical) society exercise their native
right to establishanewgovernment. Citizens may,with goodenough
cause, end the trusteeship arrangement onwhich government rests.
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But in doingso, theyhavenot dissolvedthebonds that unite them into
acivil society.
It is only in the early nineteenth century that we begin to find
thinkers employing“civil society” to mean somethingother than “po‑
litical society.” For two markedly different ways of making this dis‑
tinction, we need to consider the work of Georg FriedrichWilhelm
HegelandAlexis deTocqueville. Hegel’sPhilosophyof Right (1820)
rigorouslydistinguished “state” from “civil society” and replacedthe
Aristoteliandichotomyof householdandpolitywith the trichotomyof
family, civil society, and state. In the revised usage that Hegelpro‑
posed(andit takes only aglance at the first reviews of the Philosophy
of Rightto remindusof hownovelHegel’sproposalwas), “civil soci‑
ety” denotes the sphere of marketexchanges andthe legalandsocial
framework that sustains themarketasadomaindistinct fromboththe
privatesphere of the family andthe politicalsphere of the state. Civil
society, Hegeltells us, isthe domain of the “Bilrgerals bourgeois”‑
the citizen in the role of bourgeois: an individualwho is concerned
with the pursuit of private interests andwho pursues these interests
in amarketwhere all other individuals are likewise concernedwith
the pursuit of their own interests.15 In his drafts for Democracy in
America, Alexis deTocqueville outlinedadifferentway of separating
political and civil societywhen hesuggested that the book might be
organizedaroundatripartite divisionbetween
Politicalsociety [socie’tépolitique]‐Relationsbetween the fed‑
eral and state governments and [between] the citizen of the
Unionandof each state,
Civil society [socie’te’ civile]‐‐Relations of the citizens among
themselves, [and]
Religious society [socie’té religiouse]‐Relations between God
and the members of society, and of the religious sects among
themselves.16
In distinguishing civil society from political society, Tocqueville
was following the leadof his teacher FrancoisGuizot andhis mentor .
Pierre-Paul Boyer-Collard. Like Hegel, both had distinguished be‑
tween state and civil society, andonthe basis of this distinction had
arguedthat it wouldbeimpossible for France to return to the formof
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government that had preceded the massive social transformation
which led to the Revolution.17 In his study of American democracy,
Tocqueville pressedtheir distinction further, separating off political
forms of association from what he termed “civil associations.” The
former were established, in part, to oppose actions by the state and
thus to preservethe “independence” of the citizenry. The latter,which
addressedthe needs of “daily life,” aimedat the preservationof “civi‑
lization” itself.Without them, the citizens of ademocracywould de‑
scend into “barbarism.”18While Tocqueville mayhavebegunDemoc‑
racy in America with the idea of distinguishing “civil society” from
both “political society” and “religious society,” in executing the book
he focused soexclusively onthe oppositionbetweenpoliticalsociety
andcivil society thatwhenhe came to discuss “religious associations”
they became one example, amongothers,within the broader class of
“civil associations.”19
We are presented, then, with two markedly different ways of
distinguishingcivil frompoliticalsociety. In the modelHegeloffers, ‑
the family is conceived asaprivate sphere that binds its members
together through love,civil society isviewedasasphere inwhich in‑
dividuals pursueprivate interests publicly,andthe state isconceived
asadomain inwhich the articulationof shared,public interest isreal‑
ized. In Tocqueville’s model,“civil society” encompasses the sumtotal
of all those nonpoliticalforms of associationwhich structure social in‑
teractions between its members.
To summarize the paththat has led to this result: Down to the
end of the seventeenth century, “civil society” was equatedwith the
state and used to denote apolitical society that was distinguished
from domestic, ecclesiastical, natural, andrude forms of association.
From the seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century,
civil society comes to bedistinguished from the state, but is still de‑
finedasapolitical,asopposedto adomestic,ecclesiastical,natural,or
rude form of association. Finally, in the first half of the nineteenth
century it comes to bedistinguished frompoliticalsociety and isnow
conceived either in terms of the actions of individuals operating
within the economic sphere or along the lines of nonpolitical forms
of voluntary association includingchurches.As longascivil society is
understood as“political society” the virtues associated with it will
be‐unproblematically‐civicvirtues: civility isthe virtue ofthe citi‑
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zen. But once civil society has been split off from political society,
what sort ofvirtue isassociatedwith “civility”?
WHAT ARE THE VIRTUES OFCIVILITY?
Aswemove from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century discus‑
sions of civility andcivil society to those of ou r own day, at least one
thinghas remainedunchanged: more often than not, civility tends to
bedefinedby beingjuxtaposed to what it is not. For the Council on
Civil Society, theprimeexample of uncivilbehavior is aset of actions
thatflowfromsomethingcalledthe “philosophyof expressive individu‑
alism”: the View that individuals are “self-originatingsources of valid
claims,essentiallyunencumbered,self-owning,andauto-teleological.”
Against this notion,theCouncildefends aview of humansas“intrinsi‑
cally socialbeings,”which “canonly live in communities.”
Fromthis perspective, the basic subject of society is the human
person, and the basic purpose of government‐and all other
institutions‐is to help foster the conditions for humanflourish‑
ing. In turn, the essential conditions for humanflourishing are
the elements of whatweare callingdemocratic civil society, an‑
choredinmoral truth.”‑
If the report is somewhat vague about the “moral truth” on which
“democratic civil society” rests‐we are told that these truths are “in
largepartbiblicalandreligious” though theyhavebeenalso “strongly
informedbytheclassicalnaturallawtraditionandthe ideasof the En‑
lightenment”21(passages such asthis remindone that this reportwas
the product of a committee)‐it is a bit clearer what the authors of
the Report regardasmoral falsehoods. They are opposed to experi‑
mentationwith forms of intimate association that fall outside what
the report terms the “culture of marriage” (though the members of
the Council arecuriouslysilentastowhether their enthusiasmfor the
“culture of marriage” is robust enough to lead them to endorse the
elimination of laws that prevent members of same-sex unions from _
partakingof thebenefitsof this culture), they are criticalof thosewho
would seek alimitationonthe roleof religioninpublic life,andthey
View the alleged Virtues of the free market with some suspicion,
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insisting on the need to “relativize economics, recognizing that free
markets and cost-benefit analyses are primarily means, not ends.”22
Somewhere,Rousseauis smiling.
The vices that the Councilon Civil Societywants to restrainare
those uncivil virtues that distinguishedHegel’s Burgerals bourgeois
from Bousseau’s citoyen. Hegel’s civil society was, if nothingelse, a
playgroundfor “expressive individualism.” It offers usa“spectacle of
extravagance andwant” where that individuality that first dawned“in
aninwardform in the Christian religion” isgiven free reign (Philoso‑
phy of Right §§182, 185). Driven onward in a relentless pursuit of
self‐interest,Hegel’sbourgeois comes to realizethathe is immersedin
asocial order that transcends the intentions of any given individual.
With this comes the painful recognitionthat, to achieve one’s interest
in amarket, it is necessary to do somethingother than simplypursue
one’s own interests: one must insteadanticipate the motives andde‑
sires of other market actors. In this way, Hegel assures us, the bour‑
geois learns to know,will, andact “in auniversalway.” Ashisparticu‑
larity is “educatedupto subjectivity” andpurgedofhis idiosyncrasy,
the bourgeois begins to take on the semblance of the citoyen (Phi‑
losophy of Right M187, 189).At least that was how it was supposed
to work. That the Council on Civil Society finds it necessary to call
uponfamily ties and religiouspiety to curb the excesses of bourgeois
individualism suggests that something has gone terribly wrongwith
Hegel’svision.
Civility, asJohn Halehas observed in his discussion of Renais‑
sance manners, “was about taming.”23Within the classical republican
tradition, civic virtues aim atthe tamingof individualavarice and the
bindingof individuals into apoliticalcommunity. Butwhencivil soci‑
ety isnolongerunderstoodasapoliticalsociety, the virtues that are to
restrain individual idiosyncrasy can no longer be civic ones. Hence
the popularityof familyvalues and religiouspiety amongthose seek‑
ingtopromotewhat nowpassesas“civility.” StephenCarter’s Civility
can serve asanexample.Asevidence forwhat hedescribes asa“crisis
of civility,” Carter points both to various forms of boorishbehavior
(rude drivers, sullen gas station attendants, and quarreling talking
heads on talk shows) and to the “essentially empty rights‐talk of our
age.”24 Carter’s evidence for the latter includes afiredwaitress’s claim
that she hada“right” topierceher facewith asmanystuds and rings
asshe wishes and ahigh-school boy’s claim that hehas a“right” to
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wear droopypants.Significantly,hedoesn’t includeefforts by“family‑
values conservatives” topass legislationdefendinga“right to spank”
in his list of examples of “empty rights-talk”‐perhapsbecausewhat
he sees as empty here is the “weird new argument” that parents
should refrainfromstrikingtheir children. “I was spankedasachild,”
he tells us, “andsomehowsurvived.”
Mywife and I certainly took the time to slap our two children’s
bottomsor handswhen they were young, usually for truly dan‑
gerous infractions,like runninginto the street.Andour children,
like most others whose parents-occasionally spank, seem none
theworse for the experience.25
Facedwith suchapassage, one pauses at the phrase “usually for truly
dangerous infractions” and‐after unsuccessfully resisting the urge
to ask when else the Carter children have their “bottoms or hands”
slapped‐wonders what has become of civility when discussions of
the virtue engage in personalconfessions of this sort.
In asomewhat lessdisconcertingexample of the “cause andef‑
fect of civility” in the family, Carter recalls apassage in Joseph Car‑
dinal Bemardin’s memoirs in which Bernardin‐shortly before his
own death fromcancer‐recalledhow,whenhewas about five years
old,his fatherpreventedhimfrom fallingoffof aporch,payingnoat‑
tention to the fact that in savinghis son, hehadreopenedanincision
from arecent cancer operation. Carter takes this story asanexample
of how“civilitybuilds onitself”: afather “sacrifices his own comfort,
possibly his own health, to console his child” and then the child “re‑
members the storyandtries to act out of the same sense of sacrificial
love.”6But does this story tell usanythingabout “civility” atall?Are
the sacrifices that members of families make for one another appro‑
priate asmodels for the relationships between members of a civil
society? By grounding the norms of civility in “a sacred language”
of “sacrificial civility,” Carterwould seem to have establishedan im ‑
possiblyhighstandard(intheory) that, asit turns out, results in rather
empty practical advice. Explainingwhat weshould dowhenweare
facedwith abeggaronthe street, Carter tells usthat “civilitybyitself
cannot providetheproperstandardof charitable giving.”
Eachof usmust decide that for ourselves‐in accordance,how‑
ever,with strongnorms of sacrifice for others. Butcivility, aswe
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haveusedthe term, does suggest that the one thingwe cannot do
about the beggar.is ignorehim. . . .Weowe the beggar the same
boonof greetingor conversation that we wouldbestow on any‑
bodyelsewe happento meet.27
A no rm of “sacrificial civility” that can r un the gamut from risking
one’s ownhealthto save achild towishingabeggarapleasantday isso
broadasto benonormatall.
In anumberof essays, the lateUniversityof Chicago sociologist
EdwardShils has offeredadefinition of the virtues of civility tha t ‑
like Carter and the Report of the Council onCivil Society butwith
considerably more theoretical sophistication‐defines civility largely
in terms of sacrifice and restraint. Civility, asShils defines i t , involves
restraints on“particularistic ends.”28
Civility is abeliefwhich affirms the possibility of the common
good; it isabelief in the communityof contendingpartieswithin
amorallyvalidunityof society. It is abelief in the validity or le‑
gitimacy of the governmental institutionswhich lay down rules
and resolve conflicts. Civility is avirtue expressed in action on
behalfof thewhole society, onbehalfof the goodof allmembers
of the society to whichpublic liberties andrepresentative insti‑
tutions are integral. Civility is anattitude in individuals which
recommends that consensus about the maintenanceof the order
of society should exist alongside the conflict of interests and
ideals.29
Threats to civility come from acomplex of tendencies‐“collectivis‑
tic liberalism,emancipationism, anti‐patriotism,egalitarianism,popu‑
lism, scientism, andecclesiastical abdication”‐that Shils collectively
denoteswith the term “progressivismf‘l0All of these tendencies find
their origins in the opposition to authority andthe imposition of re‑
straints that Shils sees asthehallmarkof the Enlightenment’sattempt
to“elevatethe subject into acitizen”31‐-thoughin other contexts, Shils
seems to locate the origins of the attack oncivility with romanti‑
cism rather thanwith the Enlightenment.32While Shils’s historicalar‑
gument is casual, at best, the general thrust of his argument is clear
enough: civility involves “a solicitude for the interest of thewhole so‑
ciety, or in otherwords, a concern for the commongood”?3
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Wewouldappear tobebackontraditional ground.Civility isthe
“virtue of the citizen,” the individual who is concerned with the
commongood: it would appear to be the virtues of the citoyen rather
than those of the bourgeois. Shils follows Hegel in distinguishing
civil society from both the state and the family, but insists that the
virtues associatedwith civil society cannot be the virtues of the self‑
interested bourgeois. Instead, the virtue of civility must tame the
potentiallydestructive individualismof civil society:
Substantivecivility is the virtue of civilsociety. It is the readiness
to moderate particular, individual or parochial interests and
to giveprecedence to the common good. . . .Whenever two an‑
tagonistic advocates arrive at acompromise through recognition
of acommon interest, they redefinethemselves asmembers of a
collectivity,the goodofwhichhasprecedenceover their particu‑
lar objectives. The goodwhich is accordedprecedence by that
decisionmight benomore than the continued existence of the
collectivity inwhich they bothparticipate. The common good is
acknowledgedwherever amore inclusivecollectivity is acknowl‑
edged.34
Incivility thus involves anassertion of particular interests and ends
over those of the community, and it draws its impetus from askepti‑
cism about the ultimategoodness of publicgood.
The great enemy of political civility is something Shils dubs
“ideological politics.” Those who engage in ideological politics are
motivatedby “a coherent, comprehensive set of beliefs which must
override every other consideration.” Convinced that “they alone
have the truth about the right ordering of life,” partisans of ideo‑
logicalpolitics distrust political institutions, distrust politicians, and
introduce a “moral separatism” into politics that separates good
from evil, left from right, national from unnational, and American
from un‐Americanf’”5 Civil politics, in contrast, requires an under‑
standingof
the complexity of virtue, that novirtue stands alone, that every,
virtuous act costs something in terms of othervirtuous acts, that
virtues are intertwinedwithevils, that notheoretical systemof a
hierarchyof virtues is ever realizable in practice.36
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Civility‐which,Shils assures us,means agooddealmore than “good
manners in face-to-face relationsaL‐wouldthus seem tobethe virtue
of knowinghowto compromisebetweenvarious competingvirtues. It
is the Virtue of knowingwhennot to be too obsessedwithvirtue.
JUSTICE ORCIVILITY?
Let usconclude byconsideringwhether the following example
mightsatisfyShils’s requirements for “civilpolitics.”Membersof Con‑
gress, facedwith anissue that has causedconsiderable animosity and
bitterness between the contesting parties, recognize that continued
debate of the issuewill beunlikely to leadto aresolutionandwill in ‑
stead only aggravate differences and prevent other public business
frombeingconducted. They propose the following course of action. '
A resolution is drawnupwhich pays lip service to the claims of both
sides, but which stipulates that all future petitions and legislation
having to dowith this issuewill be tabledwithout discussion. A ma‑
jority of members of Congress,weary of partisanship,adopt the mo‑
tion. Everyonegives up something, civility is restored, ideology is re‑
strained, andCongress can goback to doingthepublic’sbusiness.
Some will perhaps recognize that the example I have sketched
is the infamous “gag rule” enacted by the UnitedState Congress in
May 1836asaway of copingwith theincreasinglybitter debate over
what shouldbe done about slavery. The gag rulewas put into effect
when South Carolina’s Henry Laurens Pickney introduced resolu‑
tions stating that 1)Congress hadnopower to interferewith slavery
in the states, 2)it wouldbe“unwise” and “impolitic” for Congress to
interferewith slavery in the District of Columbia, and3)any further
measures onthe “subject of slavery or the abolitionof slavery”would
“be laidonthe table” andnofurther action taken. It isworth remem‑
beringthat this rule representedacompromise betweenthe contest‑
ingparties (the second resolutionmade interferencewith slavery in
the District of Columbia “impolitic” but not, asothers in the South
Carolina delegation had argued, “unconstitutional”) and that it did
provideCongresswithameansofmovingontoconsideringotherbusi‑
ness. Perhaps,to that extent, the cause of civilitywas served‐which
maybeenoughtosuggest that civility isnot the first virtue ofpolitical
associations, apoint that certainlywas not loston JohnQuincyAdams,
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who securedhis greatness through along,heroic,andultimately suc‑
cessful,struggle to break the gag rule.”
Arguments in favor of civility of the sort we find in Carter and
Shils draw muchof their persuasive force from the weakness of the
opponents they construct. It is easy to disparage the “empty rights‑
talk” that concerns itselfwithbaggypants andnose rings. It is‘equally
easy to favor sober compromise overwild-eyed ideological fantasies.
But easy cases makebadnorms. That wewould beinclinedto grant
thevirtue of civility trumps in cases suchasthese tells uslittle about
howwedistinguish empty rights-talk from more serious claims or
howwedistinguishreasonablecompromises in the nameof thepublic
goodfrom timidacquiescence in the face of continuingpoliticalevils.
Forbetter orworse, the onlyway to get clear onwhat rightswehave
isto lookmore carefully atwhat it means tobeabearerof rights,and
theonlyway to evaluate thejustness of politicalcompromises is to get
clear onwhat wemeanbyjustice. Civilitymaywellbe avirtue. But it
isprobablynot avirtue thatwill beof muchhelp in deciding the po‑
liticalquestions that ultimatelymatter.39
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